Costly Credentialing
The flex only works if it would hurt a faker to copy. Cheap signals are noise.
Grounded in the research on Signalling theory (and Job market signaling, Michael Spence)
What it actually is
Costly credentialing is signaling theory applied to status: a signal is only believable if it would cost a faker more than it costs the real deal. A Harvard degree, a hard certification, six years in a niche, a verified track record — these work as signals not because of what they teach you but because they're expensive to fake. The cost IS the message. Anyone can SAY they're competent; the credential is proof because cheaters can't afford it. The mechanism is older than résumés: it's the same logic that runs in biology and economics under the name 'honest signaling.'
The science: handicaps and separating equilibria
Two real frameworks stack here. Amotz Zahavi's handicap principle (1975): a signal stays honest only when it's costly enough that low-quality fakers can't afford it — a springbok wastes energy jumping straight up (pronking) to honestly advertise 'I'm so fit I can afford to waste this.' Predators read it and don't bother chasing. Then Michael Spence's job-market signaling (1973, Nobel 2001): education works as a labor-market signal even if it teaches you nothing, BECAUSE it's cheaper for high-ability people to obtain. The market settles into a 'separating equilibrium' where the credential reliably sorts strong from weak — the diploma sorts even when the classes were useless.